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Abｓtｒａｃt:　This paper examines the implications of initial conditions in terms of the
levels of tariff protection from which countries liberalize their trade regimes on the
wage inequality in trading nations.　The discussion is confined to the standard two-
country Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model to see whether there can be channels, other
than those discussed in the recent literature, through which the observed phenomena can
be theoretically predicted. The initial conditions are observed to matter in the sense that
for countries lowering their tariff levels successively rather than once and for all, intra-
country wage inequality may change asymmetrically at different stages of liberalization.
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１
INTRODUCTION
　Empirical evidence regarding growing lntra-country wage inequality ｍ almost every
part of the globe during the last two decades and ａ half has posed ａ serious theoretical
challenge to the trade theorists to provide a plausible explanation for such obSeｒｖａtionS1･
At the same time, ａsizeable number of economists and researchers have expressed their
skepticism regarding the role of global free trade and instead have argued in favour of
technological changes in the 1980s that have brought about large shifts in the world
　Acknowledgments.　A earlierand enlarged version of the paper was presented at the conference at Ra-
bindra Bharati University, Kolkata (January 18-19, 2010). Comments and suggestions from Ron Jones,
Sugata Marjit, Abhirup Sarkar and other participantshave been quitehelpful. 1 thank Roy Ruffin and Kalyan
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　　１For a documentation of evidences on almost universal risein intra-country wage inequality readers are
referred to Marjit and Acharyya (2003).
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demand for skill-intensive goods^. However, much of the skepticism regarding the role
of trade arise primarily because of the failure of the standard neoclassical trade theories
to predict the observed wage movements. The Heckscher-Ohlin (ＨＯ)tｈｅｏrｅｍand the
Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem, the two work-horses of the neoclassical trade theory,
predict that freer trade between developed and developing countries should lower wage
inequality in the developing countries but raise the same in the developed countries. But
contrary to this prediction, wage inequality has been observed to rise in both parts of
the ｗｏrld｡
　Indeed, the issue of trade vs. technology has to be settled through proper empirical
estimates. But even then the theoretical challenge that remains is to provide analyti-
cal framework that explains two aspects of the observed phenomena: First, how does
trade liberalization increase intra-country wage inequality in the developing countries
given that they in general import skilled-labour intensive goods, and second, how does
itincrease intra-country wage inequality in almost all the trading nations, developing
and developed countries alike. There have been some notable recent attempts to gener-
ate these kinds of predictions. One set of theories attempts to explain universal rise in
intra-country wage inequality by generalizing the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (hence-
forth, ＨＯＳ)ａｎｄRicardian models of trade.　Production specialization in a different
set of goods in the skill-intensityranking by developing and developed countries in ａ
multi-commodity setting except for ａ commonly produced “middle” good (for which
the local and global skill-intensityranking differ)is the building bloc of such explana-
tions[Davis (1996), Feenstra and Hansen (1996), Marjit and Acharyya (2003, 2006),
Zhu and Trefler (2005)].In Feenstra and Hanson (1996)and Zhu and Trefler (2005), the
two countries specialize along the vertical production chain of a final good^. Thus, the
middle good is an intermediate stage of production. Marjit and Acharyya (2006) also
consider ａ commonly produced intermediate good, but the two countries specialize in
two final goods that have different skill-intensity.The intermediate good is used in the
most skill-intensive final good in the global ranking. In such ａset up, the universal rise
in intra-country wage inequality is an outcome of asymmetric responses of local prices
of the intermediate good following a tariffcut in the South. In contrast, Davis (1996) and
Marjit and Acharyya (2003)couch their analyses in multi-country and multi-commodity
settings respectively with trade and specialization in only final goods｡
　The other set of theoretical explanations is based on specificitiesin production such
as existence of non-traded goods or increasing returns to scale [Chakraborty and Sarkar
(2007, 2009), Jones and Marjit (2003), Marjit and Acharyya (2003), Xu (2003)]; fac-
tor market specificitiessuch as segmented domestic labour markets in the developing
countries[Marjit and Acharyya (2003)]; skill formation and adaptation [Yabuuchi and
Chaudhuri (2009)]; and market imperfections [Ruffin (2003, 2009)]. Dogan (2008), on
　２ For differentdogmatic positionsin the debate over trade vs. technology, see arguments of Alan Dear-
dorff,Paul Krugm皿, Edward Learner 皿d Arvind Panagariya in Journal of International Economics (2000,
ｖo1.50)皿ｄ of Jones and Engerman (1996).
　３ Feenstra and Hanson (1996) use a Ricardian continuum stage-of-production model developed by Sanyal
(1983).
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the other handけalks about the aggregation problem because prices of each the skill-
intensive goods does not rise by the same percentage when trade is opened｡
　However, all these analyses consider only once for all trade liberalization or tariff
reductions, and that too for a single country. But since the 1990s, most of the Asian and
Latin American countries started lowering their tariffseither unilaterally under their re-
spective structural adjustment programmes or through bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments. At the same time, neither the unilateral tariffreductions by countries had been
simultaneous, nor these were once and for all. More often, countries have lowered
tariffbarriers in different stages. Thus, except for reciprocated tariffreductions under
regional trade agreements, at any point of time and at any phase of the trade liberal-
ization process, levels of protection have been different across trading nations.　The
existing theoretical literature has so far not analyzed what implications these different
tariffreduction scenarios and initialconditions may have on intra-country wage inequal-
ity. This paper takes into account these variations in initial conditions when countries
liberalize their trade, and examines whether changes in the wage inequality depends
on the initial conditions. To examine to what extent the initial conditions might ｏ廿ｅ「
explanations for the observed global rise in wage inequalityけhis paper confines itself
to the standard two-factor, two-commodity HOS model without resorting to any of the
above-mentioned assumptions or production specifications｡
　Two broad cases are considered.　First is a successive tariffreduction by ａ single
country in ａtwo-country framework. Second is bilateral,but not necessarily coordinated
or reciprocated, tariffreductions by both the countries. The latter case is analyzed under
three alternative initial conditions-tariff reductions achieved from an initial arbitrarily
chosen tarifflevels; from an optimum-tariff global equilibrium; and from ａ revenue-
maximizing tariffequilibrium. In this context, l establish the following results. First,
in all these cases, itis possible to predict global rise in wage inequality. ０ｆcourse, this
is not unconditional, but more relevant is that the underlying conditions depend on the
initiallevel of protection. Second, in case of only one country reducing its tariffbut in
successive stages, the domestic relative price of itsimport good changes asymmetrically
across initial and later phases of tariffcuts, ceteris paribus. Thus, it 琲ａy be possible
that the intra-country wage inequality rises initially only in the exporting country, but
then rises in both countries atａlater stage of trade liberalization. Third, bilateral tari廿
reductions may stillcause intra-country wage inequality to rise in both countries, but
the condition gets even more stringent. Fourth, tariffreductions generate income effects
that depend on the initial trade equilibrium or objective of the government. Marginal
tariffreductions from an initial global optimum-tariff equilibrium will have no income
effects, and thus will require a different condition than similar tariffreductions from
other initialglobal equilibrium to cause global rise in wage inequality｡
　The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the standard
two-commodity-two-factor-two-country HOS model and introduce the notations used･
Section 3 and 4 discuss the conditions for rise in intra-country wage inequality in both
countries under unilateral and bilateral tariffcuts respectively. Finally, section 5 pro-
vides some concluding remarks.
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2. THE ２×2×２ HOS MODEL
　ｌ consider the standard 2 ×2×２ HOS model: Two countries, ｈｏｍｅ(Ｈ)ａｎｄfor-
eign (F), produce two goods, 1 and 2，with two internationally immobile (bｕt mobile
across sectors in each country) factors of production, skilled labour (S)ａｎｄunskilled
laboｕr(Ｌ).A11 the standard assumptions are assumed to h01d: Production functions ex-
hibit constant returns to scale technology with diminishing returns to the variable factor;
technology for each good is identical in both the countries; all domestic and world mar-
kets are perfectly competitive; skilled and unskilled workers in each country are fully
employed. Suppose, home country is relatively unskilled-labour rich and the foreign
country is relatively skilled-labour rich by the physical factor abundance definition and
good l is relatively skilled-labour intensive whereas good 2 is unskilled-labour inten-
Siｖe4.Thus, under the standard restrictions on demand, by the Hecksher-Ohlin (HO)
theory the home country (ｏrthe developing country by specification) has ａcomparative
advantage in producing relatively unskilled-labour intensive good ２ and thus exports
this good to the foreign country. The foreign country, on the other hand, has ａ compar-
ative advantage in relatively skilled-labour intensive good ｌ and thus exports this good
to the home country･
　Let, /7ｙ Pd and 弓ｄｅｎｏtｅrespectively the world relative price of imports of the
home country (i.e･，world relative price of the skill-intensive good 1), the domestic
relative price of imports in the home country and the domestic relative price of imports
in the foreign country. Note, by specification, 弓is the domestic relative price of the
unskilled-labour intensive good 2 in the foreign country. For our purpose, itis sufficient
to define world market equilibrium and the relationship between the two domestic prices
and the world price. For convenience, we specify the world market equilibrium as the
following trade-balance condition for the home country:
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　片肘( Ｐｄづ)＝肛＊(巧，ｙ＊)　　　　　　　　　巾
where, M(.) andM*(.) are respectively the home and foreign import demand functions;
y and y* are respectively home and foreign country's real income levels measured in
terms of their respective export goods.
　Let Z ＞O and Z＊＞Ｏ denote the initialrates of ad-valorem tariffsimposed by the
home and the foreign countries respectively. The relative domestic prices of imports in
the two countries are now related to the world price as f0110ｗS:
抑＝（1十 ハ岬
??＝? １＿
－　一司
(1十Z＊)
一
戸゛
｀゛hel'ｅ可isthe price of foreign export good (good l)in the foreign country.
??????
?
???
　　4 We rule out factor-intensityreversals, which per se can explain rising wage-inequality in both these
countries.
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　Apart from the trade balance condition (1), another set of key algebraic expressions
that will be used throughout this paper is the decomposition of real income changes for
each country evaluated in terms of their respective export goodS5:
㈲＝一 Ｍｄｐ 十＾(抑一戸)j肛
jy＊＝
笠ｄ岬
十pw
?
ぢー
1
-岬
ｊ肛＊
????????
The firstterm in both expressions capture the terms of trade (ＴＯＴ)ｅ廿ｅｃtwhereas the
second term captures the volume of trade effect.
３．　TARIFF REDUCTIONS BY ONE COUNTRY
　Consider ａ unilateral tariffreduction by the home country: 力＜O. At initialTOT,
this would lower the domestic relative price of imports at home proportionately, and
consequently raise the home import demand by the value of import demand elasticity
at the margin.　Recalling (4), at initialTOT, the increased volume of imports brings
in real income gains (which is larger in magnitude higher is the initial tariffrate) and
consequently ａmultiplier expansion of home country's real income and import demand･
For no change in the foreign tariff(and hence the import demand there at the initial
ＴＯＴ)，tｈｅincreased home import demand, both by the (domestic) price and income
effects, worsens the TOT for the home country unambiguously. There would thus now
be real income losses for the home country and real income gains for the foreign country･
This TOT deterioration and consequent real income loss will result in further changes
in the home import demand, but now in the downward direction, which in turn dampens
the TOT deterioration to some extent.　０ｎ the other hand, real income gain for the
foreign country worsens the TOT for the home country further as the foreign country
raises the consumption of the home-import good and thus lowers its supply in the world
market. As shown in the appendix, putting together all these changes amount to the
extent of TOT deterioration for the home country as specified below,
戸 一一
　　　　　　－εμ
(ε十ε＊－1)十泌十函＊
ﾄ０ (6)
where, m ― j石油 ＊＝TヰらＦ ａｎｄμ＝尚. Note thattheＥ十ε＊－1＞O by the
Marshall-Lerner stabilitycondition･
　From the proportional-change form of equation (2)
ん＝戸十証 (2a)
it then follows that the domestic relative price of home imports can rise after tariff
reductions if the TOT deterioration is very large. The condition for such a possibility is
given below:
μｊ＝
μ[ε＊－(1一画一応＊)]
(ε十ε＊－1)十画十画＊
ｆンO　if　s* < (1一応一応＊）
5 See Caves, Frankel and Jones (1999) for algebraic details.
(7)
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Thus, as long as (1一応一応＊)＞0，ａ unilateral tariff reduction by the home country
raises the domestic relative price of its imports if the foreign import demand elasticity
is sufficiently small as defined in (7). Since the above condition implies that £*ｍｕｓt be
less than one in value, given ａ foreign import demand function along which elasticity of
demand varies (such as ａ linear import demand function), the size of initial (restricted)
trade must be large enough for realization of this condition･
　On the other hand, the domestic relative price of foreign import good unambiguously
falls since its tariff remains unchanged. Thus,
　Proposition １.　As long as {I 一応一応＊)＞0 ，ｕｎｄｅｒ ｃｏｎｄｉtｉｏｎ (7), ａ　ｕnilatｅｒal
tａｒｉｆｆ　ｒｅｄｕｃtｉｏｎｓｏｎｌｙ　ｂｙ tｈｅ ｃｏｕｎtｒｙ　ｉｍｐｏｒtｉｎｇ ｓkill 一intｅｎｓiｖｅ ｇｏｏｄ ｒaiｓｅｓ intｒａ -ｃθ17排び
ｗａｇｅ ｉｎｅｑｕalitｙ ｉｎ ｂｏth tｈｅ ｃｏｕｎtｒｉｅｓ. Ｂｕt， ｕｎｄｅｒ ｓimilaｒ ｃｏｎｄｉtｉｏｎ， if　tｈｅ ｃｏｕｎtｒｙ　im 一
皿
ｗａｇｅ ｉｎｅｑｕalitｙ ｄｅｃｌｉｎｅｓ in both tｈｅ ｃｏｕｎtｒｉｅｓ
･
　The proof follows directly from the above discussion and the factor-intensity ranking
of home import good relative to the foreign import good. Condition (7) can be explained
as follows. Suppose, μ^ increases proportionately to the tariff reduction thereby leav-
ing the domestic relative price in the home country and hence its import demand un-
changed. Thus, home's real income declines proportionately. Let us check the state of
excess demand in the world market for home export good (i.e･， good 2) under this pre-
supposition. Decline in home country's real income lowers its domestic demand for the
export good and hence supply of exports to the world market rises by (1一画).６ ０ｎ the
other hand, foreign country's import demand (i.e･， demand for home country's export
good in the world market) increases in two ways: first by the value of foreign import
demand elasticity (ε＊))ａt the margin as the TOT improves for the foreign country;
second by the marginal propensity to consume (augmented by the multiplier effect) at
the margin, m*, as the foreign real income rises due to the TOT improvement. Hence, at
the pre-supposed level ０ｆ TOT, an excess supply of home country's export good arises,
thereby inducing a further worsening of TOT for the home country (ｏr a further rise in
ｐ町i良＊十応＊＜(1一画) . This is the condition stated in (7) above.
　The possibility of tariff reduction raising the domestic (relative) price of imports for
the home country instead of lowering it is similar to the Metzler Paradox. Metzler
(1949) noted that ａ tariff may fail to protect the domestic import-competing industries
as the tariff-inclusive price of foreign goods may actually decline. By similar logic as
the above, this happens when ,
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ε＊＜(1－剛　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(8)
　　６ Note that since we had 皿initial positive rate of tariff at home, the domestic ｄｅｍ皿d for exports rises at
home by a greater margin (1一応) than by (1一川because of the multiplier expansion in change in demand
induced by the real income ｃｈ皿ge｡
　　7 As well argued in Caves, Frankel and Jones (1997), this possibility arises for all home tariffs that
displace the home offer curve along the foreign curve within the point at which the income-consumption
curve passing through the free trade point cuts the foreign offer curve.
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The difference between this Metzler-condition and the one specified in (7) arises from
the specification of the initial equilibrium. Metzler considered an initial free trade global
equilibrium whereas in the above discussion the initial equilibrium is a restricted global
trade. The volume of trade effects on real income of countries, and consequently on
import demand become irrelevant when initially both tariffs are zero (the case of global
free trade). But, when we begin with a restricted global trade equilibrium, volume of
trade effects of tariff reductions on real income changes can no longer be ignored. These
effects make the condition for ａ paradoxical change in domestic prices more stringent
in the sense that the critical value of foreign import demand elasticity is now even lower
than what Metzler noted. The initial conditions matter in another interesting way. Let
皓
１
denote the critical value of the foreign import den!and elasticity specified in (7):
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Srjr{m,m よr＊)＝(1一応一応＊)　　　　　　　　　　(9)
It is straightforward to check that this critical value varies inversely with the initial level
0f tariff protection offered by the home country, ceteris paribus. ０ｎ the other hand, less
restricted is the initial trade, smaller is the value we can expect for the foreign import
demand elasticity. Thus, ａ sequential tariff reduction may affect the domestic prices
differently in the early and later phases of tariff reductions.　In particular, it is quite
possible that when small tariff reductions are achieved from a high level 0f protection,
domestic prices change in the usual way; but at ａ later stage, when already ａ large degree
of liberalization has been achieved, a further reduction of tariff raises the domestic price
at home, leading to rise in intra-country wage inequality in both countries. Hence,
　Lemma １ ｡　Ｗｈｅｎ ａ ｃｏｕｎtｒｙ　ｓｅｑｕｅｎtiolり祀ｄｕｃｅｓ itｓ tｏｒiff　ｒａtらgiｖｅｎ the ｓｅt of ｖ証 -
ｕｅｓ　of tｈｅ ｍａｒｇｉｎａｌ　ｐｒｏｐｅｎｓitieｓ tｏ ｃｏｎｓｕｍｅ．{m,m*)，　it　ｍａｙ　ｈｅ ｐｏｓｓible that intｒａ-
ｃｏｕｎtｒy　ｗａｇｅ ｉｎｅｑｕaliｔｙ ｗｏｒｓｅｎｓ ｉｎ ｂｏtｈ ｃｏｕｎtｒｉｅｓ ａt ａ ｌａtｅｒ ｓtａｇｅ 吋叫ｎｉｌａtｅｒal )tａｒｉｆｆ
ｒｅｄｕｃtｉｏｎ ｗｈｅｎ ａｌｒｅａｄｙ ａ ｓｉｇｎｉｆｌｃａｎtlA?　laｒｇｅ ｄｅｇｒｅｅ ｏｆ tｒａｄｅ ｌｉｂｅｒaliｚａtｉｏｎ ｈａｓ ｂｅｅｎ
achieved.
　Note that since Ｅみ£is inversely related to t*, so a global rise in the wage inequality
is more likely following a reduction in the tariff rate by the home country smaller is the
initial tariff rate of the foreign country.
　Bilateral tariff reduction as discussed below reveals further implications of the initial
conditions.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　４．　BILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTIONS
4.1.Ａｒbitｒａｒilｙ　ｃｈｏｓｅｎｉｎｉtialtａｒiff　leｖelｓ
　Consider now tariff reductions by both countries, which l term as bilateral tar-
iff reductions.　To keep things simple, consider equi-proportionate tariffreductions:
F＝戸＝δ＜0.
　First of all,note that bilateral tariffreductions will make the condition for above kind
of price movements in the two countries more stringent. To see this,suppose the home
country made the tari廿cut initially followed by the foreign country. Suppose pd rises
after the reduction in home tariffrate under condition (7). When the foreign tariffrate
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is also lowered, the TOT improves in favour of the home country (i.e･，/7゛now falls)
and thuｓ　Ｐｄdeclines. If this TOT improvement is quite large, Pd may fall below the
pre-liberalization level even under (7).ｌｎ other words, whereas home country's tariff
reduction moves the TOT against it, the foreign country's tariffreduction moves the
TOT in favour of the home country. Thus, we now have two issues to resolve. First,
at the new global equilibrium, does the TOT move in favour of or against the home
country? Second, if the TOT moves against the home country, does it move so much as
to cause the domestic price ﾉ:'jto rise above the pre-liberalization level? As shown in
the appendix, both these price changes are ambiguous:
?＝??
八/
ε＊μ＊－εμ
(ε十ε＊－1)十泌十泌＊
δ＞O　if　E＊
(μ十μ＊)ε＊－μ(1一廟一応＊)
(ε十ε＊－1)十泌十泌＊
if　E＊＜
　　μ
μ＋μ＊
??
δ＞０
(1一応一応＊)≡Ｅｋ
(10)
田）
Thus, the initial conditions now are important for both the TOT and domestic price
changes. Further implication of initial conditions can be brought out when Metzler's
own argument is extended to tariff war. Starting from an initial global free tradeけhe
Metzler-condition (8) gets altered for ａ tarijfwar between these countries as f0110ｗS:
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ε＊＜1(1 － ｍ － ｍ＊)≡４ｒ　　　　　　　　　　　(12)
Ａ few observations are in order. First,if the sum of marginal propensities to consume
(MPC) exceeds one then Metzler-paradox like price movement never occurs either un-
der tariffwar or under bilateral (ａｎｄunilateral) tariffreductions. So sum of MPCs less
than one is ａ necessary condition for the domestic price to rise in the home country
and consequently intra-country wage inequality to worsen in both countries. Second,
depending on the initialtariffprotections in the two countries, itis possible that (11) is
satisfied even though (12) is not, i.e.,s%j, < s%r.
To examine under what initialconditions Ｅ;ｒ
　　　　　　　　　　Å≡1一応一応＊
召≡
ｼ1一回-m*)-
＜ε
　　μ
μ＋μ＊
＊
ＢＬり let me define,
(1一応一応＊)
If parameter values are such that Ａ＜O， then the domestic relative price of imports at
home declines both under tariff war and bilateral liberalization. For our purpose, we
require as necessary condition thatＡ＞O so that both the criticalelasticity values 弓ｒ
and ４£are positive. ０ｎ the other hand･ for 弓ｒ＜弓バhe parameter values must be
such that B < 0. Let (ｱ, t*) and (t丿＊)be the rates of initialtariffssuch thatＡ(ｱｊ＊)＝0
　　8 The same condition held the centre-stagein the famous debate between John Maynard Keynes and Bertil
OMin over the effectof Gennan reparations payments to the Allies,known as the Transfer Problem [Keynes
(1929), OMin (1929)]. This condition would mean that the TOT moves against Germany, thereby inflicting
upon it a seconda びわＭ?ど7zof the transfer.
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Figure la.　e* < e*£form こn1＊゜0.4.
ｆ
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ｆ
Figure lb.　ε;lｒ＜ε;1£form゜0.3･琲＊゜0.5.
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£
Ｍｅtｚleｒ
Figure 2.　Metzler Paradox and Global change in Wage Inequality when Ｅ;lｒ＜らＥ
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and召(Fぼ＊)＝0.Ｆｏr any given set of values of the MPCs for which their sum is less
than one, the Aニ0 locus is downward sloping in the (ら内space as shown in Figure
1. A higher initial home tariff than F raises the value of rh and hence lowers A. Hence,
a higher initial home tariff requires lower foreign tariff than 7'＊t０leave A unchanged
at zero. Given such an inverse relationship between the home and foreign tariff rates,
the critical elasticity values Ｅ;ｒ and £d£are positive for a11 pairs of tariff rates that lie
below the Aニ0 locus. ＴｈｅＢ＝ 0 locus is not monotonic like Ａニ0 locus, and its shape
depends on the values of the MPCs. In Figure 1，ｌ consider two specific examples:
㈲= m* = 0.4) and (m = 0.3, m* = 0.5). In both these cases, it is more likely that
畷Ｔ ＜ε;£‘
　Thus, it is quite possible that tariff war and bilateral tariff reductions have altogether
different implications for the changes in domestic prices and hence intra-country wage
inequality in the two countries. Given this possibility, Figure 2 summarizes the results
derived above for parameter values for which E;ｒ＜ らむ
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4.2.　Ｆｕｒtheｒ diｓｃｕｓｓｉｏｎｓ　ｏｎｉｎｉtial　ｃｏｎｄｉtｉｏｎｓ.･　Ｏｐtimｕｍ ａｎｄ Ｍａｘimｕｍ -7?と?ven 畝丿
?ｒiがｓ 9
　Johnson(1953) in his analysis of tariff war between countries noted that each country
will retaliate to the other by imposing an optimum tariff or best-response tariff rate.
Consider such a global optimum-tariff-war equilibrium as the initial global equilibrium,
where each country imposes its best-response tariff. Thus, small scale tariff reductions
from such an initial condition would mean that real incomes do not change in both
countries. Hence, the income effects of bilateral tariff reductions discussed above drop
out, leaving the following changes in the prices:
?＝??
pｊ＝
ε＊μ＊－εμ
δ＞O　if　E＊＜
(ε十ε＊－1)
(μ十μ＊)ε＊－μ
(ε十ε＊－1)
μ
-ε
　　　　　　　μ＊
δ＞O　if　E＊＜
(13)
　　μ
μ＋μ＊
一心z (14)
Thus, now the condition for global rise in intra-country wage inequality is more directly
related to the initial levels of tariff protection. First of a11･弓£＜ぐ坦.Ｓｅｃｏｎｄ' since,
9e* 　９ｅｏｐt9|＾
-＝一一＞０
加 ∂μ　加
so, ifinitially the home tariffprotection was very h塘h and foreign tariffprotection was
10ｗ at the optimum-tariff-war equilibrium, the criticalvalue of foreign import demand
elasticityis higher. Hence, ａlarger set of values of foreign import demand elasticity
supports global rise in intra-country wage inequality･
　The other relevant initial global equilibrium is the one where the countries had im-
posed respective maximum-revenue tariffrates. The real income changes for the two
countries specified in (3) and (4) can alternatively be expressed aS:
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　㈲＝一 Ｍｄｐｄ十ｊ(t岬Ｍ )
jy＊＝一肛＊ｊぢ＋ｊ
?????
The second terms in both these expressions capture changes in tariffrevenue for the
two countries. For small scale bilateral tariffreductions in the neighbourhood of the
maximum-revenue-tariff equilibrium, these terms vanish. Accordingly, using (2) and
(3), the changes in the TOT and in the domestic price in the home country can be
worked out as (see appendix):
戸 一一
μｊ＝
[ε＊十(1十t*)m* ]μ＊－[ε十[1十〇朋]μ
(ε十ε＊－1)十(1十 t)ｍ十(1十Z＊)ｍ＊
　[ε＊十(1十Z＊)ｍ＊](μ十μ＊)－μ
(ε十ε＊－1)十(1十 ハｍ十(1十Z＊)ｍ＊
δ
δ
(15)
(16)
Thus, the income effects, as captured by the MPCs now determine the direction of
change in the TOT. The reason is being that now the real income changes are pro-
portional to the tａｒｉｆｆ一inclｕｓiｖｅworld price of imports. Thus, even at the initial TOT,
　9 1 thank Roy Ruffin for drawing my attentionto these cases.
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reduction in the home tariffrate lowers the real income (unlike in the earlier cases),
and thereby lowers the home import demand 朋ａt the margin. Similar is the case for
reduction of tariffby the foreign country･
　The change in domestic price of imports in the home country now rises, causing a
global rise in intra-country wage inequality, only if
ε＊
＜
μ[1－(1十Z＊) ｍ＊]－μ＊(1十t*)m*
　　　　　　(μ十μ＊)
一役。。 (17)
Two observations are in order. First, this condition is never satisfiedif the foreign tariff
rate at the global maximum-tariff-protected equilibrium is such that,
r＊＞
　－
１－揖＊
一
朋＊
This brings out another dimension of the initial tariffprotection. Secondけhe condi-
tion for global rise in wage inequality is now even stricterthan in the case of initial
optimum-tariff-protected global equilibrium. This is evident from the following alter-
native expression for condition (17):
ε＊
＜
　　μ
(μ十μ＊)
－(1十 t*)m* 三４．。 ＜倫z (18)
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5.　CONCLUSION
　This paper has examined how far unilateral and bilateral reductions of tariffrates
can explain the observed intra-country wage inequality in trading nations in the Stan-
dard two-country framework of HOS model. The discussion brings out the importance
of initialconditions not only in terms of initiallevel of protections, but also of the instru-
ment of trade protection. The initial conditions are observed to matter in many ways.
If one country liberalizes its trade through successive reduction of its tariffrates ce-
teris paribus, domestic prices of skill-intensive good 辨ａyrise in both countries, which
causes an increase in intra-country wage inequality to grow in both the countries. This is
more probable when initial tari廿protections were low than when they were high. This
means that in case of countries adopting sequential trade liberalization, intra-country
wage inequality in both the countries may change asymmetrically at different stages of
liberalization.
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　Using P*
yields:
㈲ 一一
-
一
一
　１
可
　　　　　　　　　ＡＰＰＥＮＤｌχ
Ａ. ＣｈａｎｇｅｉｎtｈｅＴＯＴｕｎｄｅｒtａｒiff　ｒｅｄｕｃtｉｏｎ
_ (l+t* !, total differentiation of the trade balance condition （1）
M ｄｐ－＋μ゛
???
dｐｄ ＋ ⊇） 一一
一Ｍ ｄＰ１”＋tP1”ｄＭ ＝一 Ｍ ｄＰ１”＋ゆ゛
dy =
［
戸十μｸﾞｼεん］
１一加
j巧十 jy＊
(Ａ.2)
(Ａ.3)
竺
川
???
Usinヴ脊 = m and s≡―舒§jU， thisboilsdown to
3Ｍ ＊
-
∂y＊
　　　　　⇒(片肛)片－ε(片肛)ん十 ｍｄｙ＝－ε＊肛＊ぢ十戸田＊㈲＊　　(A.I)
Ｆrｏｍ(3)，ｏｎthe other hand, the change in home country's real income can be worked
out as follows:
加十些　　∂y
?????
一戸肛[戸十防ん]
　　　１一加
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Similarly,
肛＊
jy＊＝
ﾚ・一瑞六大］
ρ゛(1－r＊沢＊)
Substitution of (A.3) and (A.4) in (A. 1) yields:
戸－ε加一
斗
一
一
-
-
１一階7
－ε＊巧十
-
１一階7
づ卜
??
??
（?
沢＊
1－r＊
　　沢
-
-
肛＊[β゛－r＊ε＊弓]
　ρ゛(1一 戸ｍ ＊)
　　　｢
(1十 t)p^
mｅｄｐｄ
１一加
沢＊
戸－
E*m*
1
ド;:
?
]βUﾉ
-
1＋Z＊
p町ｎ
1－Z＊限＊
　　μμ
卜万‰］
m　　　　　　ｍ＊
一一
1 - tm 　　1 ― t*m*
戸
十・
１一加 ト
ε[戸十丿]＝－ε＊[戸－μ＊内
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(A.4)
(A.5)
　Solving for 戸yields the change in TOT under bilateral tariffreduction as sPe?led
in the text, which is reproduced below as eq. (Ａ.6):
戸＝
　　　　ε＊μ＊－εμ
(ε十ε＊－1)十泌十函＊
δ (A.6)
Hence, using んニ戸＋μF and (A.5) we a?ve at the change in the domestic price of
imports in the home country as spe?led in eq. (7) in the text.
　For unilateral tariffreduction by the ｈｏｎ!ｅcountry, the second term on the right hand
side in (A.5) is zero so that the TOT change now equals,
戸＝
　　　　　　－εμ
(ε十ε＊－1)十函十泌＊
δ＞０
Once again the change in domestic prices can be calculated as before.
B. PRICE CHANGES UNDER MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFF
　Recall from the text that,at the maximum-revenue tariff,the realincome changes
equal,
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　dy= -Ｍｄｐｄ
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　dy*=一封＊ dpl
Substitutionof these values in (A.I) yields:
戸-ﾚ十 ぜ
μ゛
吻
一
一 －[ε＊十岬Ｐ頴 ＊]巧
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　　　　　　　⇒戸－[ε十(1十〇副加＝－[ε＊十[1十巾?]巧
Ｕsingん＝β゛十詞｀ａｎｄ付＝－β゛十μ *i* thisboils down to when solved for the
change in TOT as,
?＝?? [εヽ＊十(1十Z＊)ｍ＊]μ＊－[ε十[1十〇ａ]μ
(ε十εヽ＊－1)十(1十〇肌十(1十 t*)m*
which is the expression in the text.
δ
